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One possible explanation for the unsatisfactory implementation of IMF con-
ditionality has been attributed to the lack of credibility of the IMF threat of
interrupting financial assistance in case of non compliance with the negotiated
conditions. In this paper we suggest that such lack of credibility might be due
to the dual role played by the IMF which acts at the same time as a creditor
and a monitor of economic reforms. We show that the IMF incentive to hide its
surveillance failures, in order to preserve its reputation of being a good moni-
tor, may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater laxity (relative to
social optimum) in punishing non-compliance with economic reforms. We have
empirically tested such theoretical result by supposing that larger departures
from eﬃciency of the IMF lending rule are associated with a longer relationship
between a country and the IMF. The longer this relationship, the stronger the
IMF reputation will be aﬀected in case it ultimately decides to stop lending.
Specifically, we have empirically investigated whether IMF disbursements are
aﬀected by the IMF own share of debt, which is taken as a proxy for the dura-
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show that a higher IMF debt share does increase IMF disbursements.
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1 Introduction
On March 9th Argentina is supposed to make a scheduled repayment of money it owes to
the International Monetary Fund..... If no payment is made, the IMF must set in train a
process that would eventually declare Argentina in default, and that would be uncomfortable
in the extreme for the IMF. The size–$16 billion has been lent to Argentina–would be
unprecedented, with consequences for the Fund’s reputation and for the way it does busi-
ness.... Certainly, the Fund has got into a position that its own experts would condemn if
it were a commercial bank. Some 15% of the Fund’s total lending is to Argentina, a huge
concentration. And with the $13.5 billion, three-year facility agreed in September, the Fund
is in eﬀect continuing to lend large sums to what is in eﬀect an insolvent debtor, on the
understanding that it will use this to repay past loans.
Which is the victim? The Economist, Mar 4th 2004
In a nutshell, the Fund’s current resources of $150 billion seem like enough to cause
moral-hazard problems (that is, to induce excessive borrowing) without being enough to deal
with a really deep global financial crisis. The Fund is just too politicised to be a consistently
eﬀective lender of last resort, and if its financial structure is not changed, there are always
going to be Argentinas. (If nothing else, there will always be Argentina.)
No, the right future for the Fund, as for the IBRD, is to phase itself out of the lending
business. The Fund can still make itself very useful in co-ordinating the global financial
system, in oﬀering technical advice, and perhaps even in issuing debt ratings to countries
that request it. If the global community can work its way towards an improved bankruptcy
procedure for sovereign borrowers, this path will be far easier. I would recommend it regard-
less.
The sisters at 60 (Ken Rogoﬀ). The Economist, July 22nd 2004
There exists a large body of evidence documenting an unsatisfactory record of
IMF conditionality implementation by borrowing countries.1 Furthermore, the IMF
has recently come under criticism for allowing some countries to establish long-term
relationships, while, according to its original mandate, the Fund could only guarantee
temporary assistance. Indeed, some countries have participated in a continuous series
of Fund programmes over time and their duration has being increasing in recent
decades (Joyce, 2004b). Moreover, a large proportion of IMF programmes are not
successfully completed, with non-completion being not an indicator of graduation
from the Fund but rather one of future referrals (on “recidivism” see Bird et al.,
2004).2
What are the reasons adduced by the literature for conditional lending failure?
They have generally been investigated looking at the characteristics of the borrowing
1For a review of this literature see Joyce (2004a).
2According to Mussa and Savastano (1999) only 47% of all IMF programmes have been success-
fully completed.
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countries, with more attention being recently devoted also to a country’s political and
institutional features. For example, Ivanova et al. (2003) conclude that programme
implementation depends primarily on the domestic political economy of borrowing
countries. More specifically, strong special interests, political instability, ineﬃcient
bureaucracies, lack of political cohesion and ethno-linguistic divisions are shown to
weaken programme implementation.3
However, more recently, the possibility that the IMF specific interests may influ-
ence the adoption of an IMF programme (and in turn its implementation) has also
been considered. For example, Barro and Lee (2003) find that IMF loans tend to be
larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota and more professional
staﬀ at the IMF or when a country is more connected politically and economically to
the United States and other major shareholders. In the case of low income countries
(when IMF lending is highly concessional), Svensson (2000) argues that the welfare
of the poors may enter the IMF utility function making not credible its threat of ter-
mination of financial assistance, when a country is not complying with conditionality.
Furthermore, according to the public choice approach to institutions (Vaubel,
1986, 1991), there would be a shift in responsibility from the executive directors to
staﬀ oﬃcials, who may decide to pursue the objectives of maximising their own budget
and size without concern for the Fund mandate. Such a bureaucratic bias would lead
the Fund to simply try to sign as many agreements as it can with the result that it may
have little incentive to punish non compliance. Finally, Ramcharan (2003) presents
an analytical model in which the IMF (as a creditor) could have little incentive to
interrupt financial assistance to borrowing countries that did not manage to meet
conditionality. When a country’s debt becomes large enough to put its ability to
repay at risk, for the IMF (as a creditor) may simply be optimal to keep on lending
and rolling over the debt, until a debt restructuring mechanism (acting as a sort of
bailout) becomes available.4 In turn, such a behaviour, if anticipated by a debtor
country’s government, would perversely aﬀect its own willingness to reform.5
In this paper we join the view that the lack of credibility of the IMF threat of early
terminating financial assistance can be responsible for conditionality failure. However,
3Since the success of a reform crucially depends on its successful implementation (which in turn
reflects a country’s political constraints) the IMF has been recently put much emphasis on a country’s
“ownership” of a programme (on this see, for example, Drazen, 2002).
4Marchesi and Missale (2004) have empirically confirmed that existing multilateral debt has a
robust impact on multilateral new net loans to Heavily Indebted and Poor Countries (or HIPCs). In
the case of Sub-Sahara countries, Birdsall et al. (2002) have found that donors, especially bilaterals,
made greater transfers to countries with high multilateral debt, despite their bad policies.
5In the case of HIPCs, Easterly (2002) claims that multilateral creditors have worried so much
about their liabilities not to pay enough attention to countries’ability to generate future income
through economic growth. Moreover, this behaviour provided debtor countries with the incentives
to avoid or postpone conditional reforms, since they anticipated that lenders would have given them
loans anyway.
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we look at this problem from a diﬀerent perspective, exploring the implications of the
dual role of the IMF which simultaneously acts as a lender and as a monitor of
economic reforms. In this context we take a political economy approach, where the
IMF has its own objective function (which does not necessarily correspond to social
optimum)6 and we follow a stream of literature examining the policy implications of
a self-interested bank regulator.7 Although this literature has been developed in a
completely diﬀerent framework, it actually oﬀers useful insights for the issues tackled
in this paper.
Bank regulators are supposed to monitor banks’ risk taking in order to force
compliance with regulation (on taxpayers’ behalf). Furthermore, in case of financial
distress, they should use the collected information to decide whether to support the
bank (leave it in the market) or close it. Between global taxpayers and the IMF
there exists a similar delegation problem: the IMF acts as a delegated monitor to
assure country’s compliance with the negotiated set of conditions. Besides, through
the surveillance function, Fund oﬃcials collect private information that should be
used to decide whether or not to continue financial assistance. It is this informative
advantage which may allow a self-interested bank regulator/Fund to take actions that
may sometimes contrast with the taxpayers’/global taxpayers’ interest.
Building on Boot and Thakor (1993), we model the IMF self-interest by intro-
ducing uncertainty about its ability to monitor governments’ implementation of con-
ditionality. Global taxpayers, by observing a country’s economic performance over
time, can revise their beliefs about the IMF quality as a good monitor (it is assumed
that the economic reforms imposed by conditionality improve expected output). This
circumstance generates incentives for the IMF to take actions to protect its reputation
as a good monitor and, in turn, this incentive can create significant departure from
a socially optimal lending rule. The ineﬃciency stems from the fact that, due to its
surveillance function, the IMF is always more informed than global taxpayers about
the government real economic reform eﬀort. This information advantage implies that
the action of closing or continuing a programme not only provides global taxpayers
with some information about a country’s implementation of conditionality but also
conveys information about the IMF quality as a monitor. We show that the desire
to avoid a loss of reputation might lead the Fund to exhibit some laxity (relative to
social optimum) in interrupting financial programmes when countries are not meeting
conditionality.8 In turn, when the threat of stopping lending is not credible, borrow-
ing countries’ governments may not have the right incentives to fully comply with
6Self-interest in international financial institutions can take a variety of forms (see, for example,
Allegret and Dulbecco, 2004).
7See Boot and Thakor (1993), Repullo (2000), Khan and Santos (2001).
8If the IMF supervisory information was observable, the circumstance that the Fund may be
self-interested would not cause any problem since it could be forced to take the right actions by its
constituency.
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conditionality.9
The length of the relationship between the IMF and the borrower country may
exacerbate the departure from the socially optimal lending rule towards stronger
laxity. In fact, when the Fund decides to interrupt a financial programme, after being
involved with a country for many years, this circumstance could strongly signal that
the Fund has not been able to monitor the implementation of reforms for a long time.
In other words, the negative impact on IMF reputation of the decision to interrupt
financial assistance should be an increasing function of the length of the relationship
with the borrowing country.
We decided to empirically test the hypothesis that the longer the relationship
between a country and the Fund the more willing to lend the IMF would be. More
specifically, we empirically investigated whether a high debt and its composition by
type of creditors played an important role in explaining the allocation of IMF dis-
bursements, by taking the level of IMF outstanding debt as a proxy for the length
of the relationship between the Fund and a country.10 According to our hypothe-
sis, controlling for countries’ characteristics and their economic performance, IMF
disbursements should be correlated with the IMF own share of debt.
We estimated a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries (listed in Table
1) over the period 1982 to 2001, controlling for countries’ characteristics and their
economic performance and including both country-specific eﬀects and time eﬀects.
We find that a higher level of IMF debt significantly increase IMF disbursements.
Moreover, we find that larger loans went to countries in which commercial banks
from industrial countries were highly exposed.11 Therefore, the empirical evidence
looks consistent with the main prediction of the theory.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is developed in Section 2, the socially
optimal closure rule and the government’s first period choice of the level of reform are
discussed in Section 3 and 4. Section 5 derives the reputational equilibrium. Section 6
develops the empirical framework and Section 7 presents the empirical results. Section
8 finally contains some policy implications and concludes the paper.
9We make the standard assumption that governments dislike the economic reforms imposed by
conditionality either because they hinder the use of state apparatus to extract economic and political
rents or to avoid a loss in their popularity. Among others see Svensson (2000) and Drazen (2002).
10The data actually show that the correlation between the two is very high (about 0.7).
11This is consistent with the evidence presented, among others, by Copelovitch (2004) who argues
that IMF lending decisions are responsive to the interests of large industrial countries.
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2 Theoretical model
2.1 Sequence of events
In the model there are three agents: the IMF, the government of the country entering
an IMF financial programme, and global taxpayers. All agents are risk neutral. Time
extends over two periods.
At t=0 the country has investments in place which pay-oﬀ at t=1 a random
amount: ey ∈ [0, y], F (.), f(.) where F (.) is a cumulative distribution function, f(.)
is the associated probability density function and y is a positive finite real valued
scalar. Furthermore, at t=0, the country borrows $1 from the IMF to finance a
supplementary investment project whose expected payoﬀ depends on the country’s
choice of a variable R1. By R1 we denote the degree of economic reform selected by
the country’s government in period 1, with R1 ∈ [0, 1] .
The supplementary investment payoﬀ yields a random payoﬀ eI1 at the end of the
first period. eI1 may take the value of I1 > 1, with probability p1(R1) ∈ (0, 1), and
the value of 0 with the complementary probability. For simplicity we suppose that
the IMF requires a risk-free interest rate that is assumed to be zero.
Assumption 1. We assume p1(.) is a continuous twice diﬀerentiable concave func-
tion of R1. The function is strictly increasing within the range R1 ∈ [0, R∗].12
By undertaking economic reforms up to the level R∗ the government increases
eﬃciency and thus enhances the expected payoﬀ from the investment. However, since
reforms eliminate economic and other distortions, they can also reduce the level of
political and economic rents that can be extracted by the government for its private
gain. Let C1(R1) be the cost in terms of rents reduction associated to the economic
reform level. We assume the following:
Assumption 2. C1(.) is a continuous twice diﬀerentiable increasing convex function
of the economic reform level, where C1(0) = 013
At t=1 the country realises ey+ eI1 and first period debt is paid oﬀ. It now needs a
second loan to finance another investment project. The new investment also requires
$1 to be financed. We suppose that, whatever the realized payoﬀ at t=1 is, the
country always needs IMF financial assistance, that is y+ I1 < 2. If ey+ eI1 is less than
1, the government can not repay first period debt. In this case, if financial assistance
is continued, first period debt is postponed to the end of the second period, while, if
12A degree of economic reforms exceeding R∗ has negative eﬀects. This could be explained by
referring to output losses due to social conflicts generated by reforms. For example, if the labour
force feels that an IMF adjustment program is imposing an unnecessary hardship, the government
may lack the societal support to continue the adjustment program and eﬃciency may suﬀer. In
general it is realistic to consider the economic reform process as a sequential process in which time
is essential to allow the economy to adapt to the new environment.
13We also assume that ∂p1(0)∂R1 >
∂C1(0)
∂R1 to avoid corner solutions in the maximisation problem.
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it is interrupted, the IMF loses ey + eI1 − 1. The assets in place at t=0 expire at t=1
and so there is no payoﬀ from those assets at t=2.
If the country is allowed to continue, we assume that the new investment has
a random payoﬀ eI2 which takes the value of I2 > 214 with probability p2(R2) and
the value of 0 with the complementary probability. By R2 we denote the degree of
economic reform selected by the government in period 2, with R2 ∈ [0, 1] .
Assumption 3. If R1 6= R∗, p2(.) = p1(.); if R1 = R∗, p2(.) = p1(.) + α, where α
is a positive finite real valued scalar such that p1(R∗) + α < 1.
From assumptions 1 and 3 it follows that p2(.) is strictly increasing within the
range R2 ∈ [0, R∗] . Furthermore we assume that the probability of success of the
second period project has a “jump” when the social optimal level of economic reforms
R∗ is attained in the first period. The rationale behind this hypothesis rests on the fact
that financial assistance is more productive in a good policy environment. Moreover,
in period 2, economic and political rents are a decreasing function of the second period
reform eﬀort. For simplicity we impose the following:
Assumption 4. C2(.) = C1(.)
2.2 Role of IMF
The IMF is entrusted with two tasks:
1) The IMF identifies and suggests the level of economic reforms R∗ which max-
imizes the first period country output and monitors the government’s reform eﬀort.
Due to its quality as a good monitor, the IMF has the possibility to discover de-
partures from the optimal reform level R∗ early enough to “enforce” the corrections
needed to reach it by the end of the first period. This power comes from the threat
of immediately interrupting the programme and soon recovering the initial loan by
seizing the assets in place and getting back the fraction of the loan not yet been spent.
Facing this threat, due to the impossibility of completing the investment project, the
government will be forced to choose the optimal reform level R∗.15 If the IMF does
not detect such departures early enough, the reform level achieved by the end of the
first period will be the one which is privately preferred by the government.
2) The second task consists in the decision to refinance the country at t=1. At the
end of the first period, the IMF is able to observe the actual level of reforms and it
has to decide whether or not to continue lending. In the second period, for simplicity
we exclude the possibility of monitoring. Moreover, since the economy terminates
at the end of it, at this point, the IMF is not able any more to influence the choice
14This restriction guarantees that the government strictly prefers to be allowed to finance the
second period project at t=1, even when the total first period payoﬀ is very low.
15In our model, the interim period is meant to capture the traditional structure of an IMF loan,
which is divided into tranches and where the access to successive tranches is guaranteed by the
implementation of conditionality.
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of reform eﬀort by the threat of lending termination. Thus, the IMF is not able to
control the second period economic reform level.
Assumption 5. The IMF can be of two types: a good monitor or a bad monitor.
If it is a good monitor it will manage to enforce R∗ at the end of the first period with
probability ρg, if it is a bad monitor the probability would be ρb, with ρg > ρb.
At t=0, the IMF type is unknown to everybody but global taxpayers and the
country’s government have got a prior belief γ ∈ (0, 1) that it is a good monitor16. At
t=1 the IMF observes the choice of R1 and ey+ eI1. Global taxpayers, at this stage, do
not observe anything apart from the IMF decision to refinance or not refinance the
country. At t=2, global taxpayers observe the realisation of the first period outputey + eI1. The sequence of events is described in Figure 1.
The IMF maximizes a weighted sum of two arguments. The first is a “private”
gain deriving from its reputation as a good monitor, the second is the social surplus
arising from second period investment:
Max λ1 {γ1 + δγ2}+ λ2 {p2(R2)I2 − 1} (1)
where λ1, δ, λ2 are positive finite real valued scalars and γ1, γ2 are global taxpayers
posterior beliefs about the IMF type at the end of the first and the second period,
respectively.17 If λ1 = 0, the IMF would be totally “selfless”, while if λ2 = 0, the
IMF would be completely “selfish”.
At t=0, the government chooses R1 to maximize the expected profits over the
two periods. The “continuation probability” is computed on the basis of the IMF
conjectured lending policy, to be defined below. At t=1, if financial assistance is
continued, the government choosesR2 to maximize the second period expected profits.
3 Socially optimal lending rule
Whatever the realization of the first period investment and the payoﬀ from assets in
place at t=1 are, it will be socially optimal to continue lending if:
p2(R2)I2 ≥ 1 (2)
Thus, the socially optimal lending rule would dictate to stop lending whenever the
second period reform level chosen by the government is such that the project’s NPV
is negative.
16For example, the existence of uncertainty over the IMF monitoring ability could be explained
by the uncertainty over the ability of the executive directors to monitor the activity of staﬀ oﬃcials.
17We do not include an IMF budget constraint since the Fund can activate supplementary bor-
rowing arrangements (through GAB and NAB) if it believes that its resources might fall short of
members’ needs. In turn, such IMF ability depends on its reputation where reputation building is
indeed an argument of the Fund objective function.
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By assumption 3, the socially optimal choice for R2 is:
R∗ = argmax p2(R2) (3)
To better define the socially optimal lending rule, we have to solve for the actual
second period reform level that a government, with own capital equal to ey+eI1−1 = ek,
would choose. The government solves the following optimization problem:
Max
R2
l(R2) = p2(R2)(I2 − (1− ek))− ek − C2(R2) (4)
where first period reform level is given.
Solving (4) we find that the unique maximizer of (4) bR2 is implicitly given by:
∂C2( bR2)
∂R2
∂p2( bR2)
∂R2
= I2 + ek − 1 (5)
Proposition 1 (i) bR2 < R∗ unless ∂C2(R2)∂R2 = 0. (ii) ∂ bR2(ek)∂ek > 0
Proof. (i) It is immediate from equation (5) (ii) It derives from equation (5) and the
implicit function theorem.
Proposition 1 implies that the lower the country’s second period own capital (i.e.
the higher the IMF financial assistance), the lower the reform eﬀort chosen by the
government in the second period. This result is quite intuitive since the debt overhang
reduces the ownership on the project’s output, whereas the cost of reforms in terms
of rents reduction are always entirely borne by the government.
Assumption 6. If R1 = R∗, it is socially optimal to continue lending, that is:
(p1( bR2(ek)) + α)I2 > 1 ∀ek
Assumption 6 implies that, if in the first period the IMF manages to enforce the
socially optimal level of reforms, the net present value of the second period project
will be positive, independently of the second period choice of reform eﬀort.18 Thus,
accomplishment of conditionality in the first period is a suﬃcient condition for having
access to a financial programme at t=1, under a socially optimal lending rule. We
can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If R1 6= R∗ there exists a threshold level for ek such that if ek < k it is
economically rational for the IMF to stop lending. If ek > k, it is socially optimal to
continue, where k is found solving p2( bR2(k))I2 = 1.
18This assumption helps simplifying the analysis. However, our results would be substantially
unaﬀected by the alternative assumption that for low level of capital the project’s NPV is negative.
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When the IMF follows a socially optimal lending rule, choosing a high level of
reforms in the first period, provides insurance against early termination of the pro-
gramme (due to adverse shocks) because by increasing the first period reform eﬀort
the probability of low realizations of ek is reduced. At the limit, i.e. when R1 = R∗,
the probability of continuing with the programme is one.
4 The equilibrium level of first period economic
reforms
In this section we want to derive the government’s privately optimal level of first
period reforms. We start by assuming that the government’s privately optimal level
of first period reforms is always less than R∗.19 First of all we analyse the case in which
the IMF will never stop lending, while we will analyse below the case in which the
IMF will follow the socially optimal lending rule. Let bRL1 represent the government’s
privately optimal first period reform under the assumption that the IMF is always
willing to lend. Let’s now define the expected profits to the government for acceding
to the second loan as follows:
L(R1) = p1(R1)
Z y
0
p2( bR2(eks))(I2 − (1− eks))− eks − C2( bR2(eks))f(y)dy + (6)
(1− p1(R1))
Z y
0
p2( bR2(ekf))(I2 − (1− ekf))− ekf − C2( bR2(ekf))f(y)dy
where eks is the country’s own capital in case of success of the first period investment
while ekf is the level of capital in case of failure.
Let ρ = γρg +(1− γ)ρb be the prior belief-weighted probability that the IMF will
be able to enforce the choice of R∗ in the first period and let φ(R1) = p1(R1)(I1−1)−
C1(R1) denote the government’s expected profits from the first period investment
project. We can now write the country’s government problem, at t=0, as that of
choosing R1 to maximize the following:
X(R1) = (1− ρ)(φ(R1) + L(R1)) + ρ(φ(R∗) + L(R∗)) (7)bRL1 satisfies the following:
∂X( bRL1 )
∂R1
= (1− ρ)
Ã
∂φ( bRL1 )
∂R1
+
∂L( bRL1 )
∂R1
!
= 0. (8)
19This assumption is needed in order to exclude that the increase in the second period probability
of success (α), due to the choice of R∗, would be suﬃcient to induce the government to choose the
social optimum level of eﬀort. However, the case in which the IMF and the recipient government
had the same objectives would not be very interesting per sé.
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We want now to examine the relationship between ek and the second period profits.
From equation (4) we obtain:
l( bR2(ek)) = p2( bR2(ek))(I2 − (1− ek))− ek − C2( bR2(ek)) (9)
where bR2(ek) is given by (5) and (9) represents, for each value of ek, the maximum
value of the second period expected profits of the government, conditional on being
allowed to continue.
Proposition 3 At the beginning of the second period for a given choice of the first
period reform, the government is better oﬀ with a lower capital, conditional on being
allowed to continue.
Proof. Using the envelope theorem, it is easy to show that:
∂l( bR2(ek))
∂ek = p2( bR2)− 1 < 0.
Proposition 3 tells us that the government has an interest in undertaking actions in
the first period that result in a lower expected capital in the second period, conditional
on being allowed to continue. Therefore, given the positive relationship between R1
and the expected value of ek (∂E0(ek|R1)∂R1 > 0), the government’s incentive to implement
economic reforms would be perversely aﬀected. More specifically:
Proposition 4 Conditional on being allowed to finance the second period project,
the government has an incentive to choose a lower level of reforms R1 than it would
choose in a single-period setting .
Proof. It is obvious by observing that ∂L(R1)∂R1 < 0 ∀R1. Thus, when R1 = bRL1 , by
equation (8), ∂φ(R1)∂R1 > 0.
Suppose now that the IMF will refuse to concede a new loan whenever ek < k and
let’s assume that eks > k, for each realisation of ey. On the contrary, when ek = ekf , let
yc = k+1 be the minimum realisation of ey which allows the government to obtain the
second loan in case of failure of the first period project. Let’s now defineM(R1,yc) as
the second period expected profits, conditional on the socially optimal lending rule:
M(R1, yc) = p1(R1)
Z y
0
p2( bR2(eks))(I2 − (1− eks))− eks − C2( bR2(eks))f(y)dy + (10)
(1− p1(R1))
Z y
yc
p2( bR2(ekf))(I2 − (1− ekf))− ekf − C2( bR2(ekf))f(y)dy
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It is immediate to verify that:
M(R1, yc) = L(R1)−(1−p1(R1))
Z yc
0
p2( bR2(ekf))(I2−(1−ekf))−ekf−C2( bR2(ekf))f(y)dy
(11)
Thus, the government problem, at t=0, now becomes that of choosing R1 to
maximize the following:
X(R1, yc) = (1− ρ)(φ(R1) +M(R1, yc)) + ρ(φ(R∗) + L(R∗)) (12)
Let now bRSO1 be the level of first period reform which maximises (12).
Proposition 5 If the IMF will refuse credit continuation whenever ey < yc the desire
to preserve second period profits will induce the government to choose a higher reform
level in the first period, that is bRSO1 > bRL1
Proof. To prove the result it is suﬃcient to show that:
∂X(R1, yc)
∂R1
|R1= bRL1> 0
From equation (8) noting that:
∂φ(R1)
∂R1
+
∂L(R1)
∂R1
|R1= bRL1= 0
we have:
∂X(R1, yc)
∂R1
|R1= bRL1=
−(1− ρ)
µ
∂(1− p(R1))
∂R1
¶Z yc
0
p2( bR2(ekf))(I2 − (1− ekf))− ekf − C2( bR2(ekf))f(y)dy
where the right hand side is surely positive.
5 Lending policy in a reputational equilibrium
In this section we want to examine whether the socially optimal lending policy is sus-
tainable in equilibrium. We start by assuming that the market (both global taxpayers
and the country’s government) believe that the IMF will stop lending whenever ek < k
and we will show that this belief is unsustainable in equilibrium. The first thing to
show is that it is always true that: γ1(NL) < γ1(L), where NL stands for Not Lending
and L for Lending.
12
If global taxpayers observe L this can be the consequence of two events: either
R1 = R∗, or R1 = bRSO1 and ek > k. Applying Bayes’ rule we have
γ1(L) = prob(g | L) =
γprob(L | g)
γprob(L | g) + (1− γ)prob(L | b) (13)
where:
prob(L | g) = ρg + (1− ρg)
Z I+y−1
k
h(ek | R1 = bRSO1 )dek (14)
and
prob(L | b) = ρb + (1− ρb)
Z I+y−1
k
h(ek | R1 = bRSO1 )dek (15)
by which it is easy to show that γ1(L) > γ, noting that (14) is greater than (15).
20
Alternatively, if global taxpayers observe NL, this event signals that the joint event
R1 < R∗ and ek < k has realized. The interruption of the lending programme provides
global taxpayers with the information that the IMF has not been able to monitor and
finally enforce the optimal level of reforms. Since this is more likely for a bad monitor
than for a good monitor, applying Bayes’ rule, we have:
γ1(NL) = prob(g | NL) =
γprob(NL | g)
γprob(NL | g) + (1− γ)prob(NL | b)
where
prob(NL | g) = 1− ρg
and
prob(NL | b) = 1− ρb
by which it is easy to show that γ1(NL) < γ. Therefore γ1(NL) < γ < γl(L).
If the IMF was completely selfish its objective function would be the first argument
of (1). If the financial assistance programme was stopped at the end of the first period
the IMF would end up with:
γ1(NL) + δγ1(NL)
since γ1 = γ2. While, if the IMF did not stop lending, it would obtain:
γ1(L) + δγ2(L,ek)
Proposition 6 γ2(L,ek) > γ1(NL) ∀ek
20h is the probability density function of the sum of the two stochastic variables eI1 and ey.
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Proof. (i) If ek > k, global taxpayers, applying Bayes’ rule, would obtain:
prob(L,ek > k | g) = ρgprob(ek > k | R1 = R∗) + (1− ρg)prob(ek > k | R1 = bRSO1 )
prob(L,ek > k | b) = ρbprob(ek > k | R1 = R∗) + (1− ρb)prob(ek > k | R1 = bRSO1 )
Since ∂E0(
ek|R1)
∂R1 > 0, we observe that
prob(L,ek > k | b)
prob(L,ek > k | g) < 1− ρb1− ρg
by which it is easy to show the result.
(ii) ek < k, given the conjectured equilibrium strategies, this observation would be
consistent only with the choice of R1 = R∗, then:
prob(L,ek < k | b)
prob(L,ek < k | g) = ρbρg < 1− ρb1− ρg
and the result is straightforward.
Therefore, it follows that, for each level of ek observed by global taxpayers at the
end of the second period, it would never be rational for the “completely selfish” IMF
to interrupt the financial assistance programme. Thus, when the IMF is totally selfish,
the socially optimal lending rule cannot be sustainable in equilibrium.21 Alternatively,
when the IMF objective function is a mix of the two arguments (reputation and
second period project’s NPV), the IMF will weight the reputation loss deriving from
the decision of stopping the programme against the welfare loss deriving from the
decision to finance a negative NPV project. In this case, the following Proposition
describes the IMF optimal strategies, given the global taxpayers equilibrium beliefs.
Proposition 7 The following strategies and beliefs constitute a Bayesian subgame
perfect equilibrium.
IMF equilibrium strategies (reputational lending rule).
When R1 = R∗, the IMF will continue lending whatever the level of capital is.
When R1 6= R∗, the IMF will stop lending if ek ≤ ←−k , while it will continue lending ifek > −→k . For intermediate ek, i.e. ←−k < ek < −→k , the IMF will continue lending with
probability θ(ek), where ∂θ(ek)∂ek > 0 and θ(−→k ) = 1 and θ(←−k ) = 0.
Global taxpayers equilibrium beliefs.
First stage.
If global taxpayers observe L, they would know that this can be due to two events:
either R1 = R∗ or, with probability θ(ek), R1 6= R∗ and ek > ←−k , and they would
21When the IMF is completely selfless (i.e. it is just a social surplus maximizer) it will always
apply the socially optimal lending rule and so this will be the only possible equilibrium.
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update their beliefs accordingly, using Bayes’ rule. Alternatively, if they observe NL,
they would know with certainty that R1 6= R∗ and they would update their beliefs
accordingly using Bayes’ rule.
Second stage.
(i) L has been observed at t=1. If global taxpayers observe ek ≤ ←−k they would
know with certainty that R1 = R∗ and they would update their beliefs accordingly,
using Bayes’ rule. If global taxpayers observe ek > ←−k they would know that this can
be due because of two events: either R1 = R∗ or, with probability θ(ek), R1 6= R∗ andek >←−k , and they would update their beliefs accordingly using Bayes’ rule.
(ii) NL has been observed at t=1. Since the information set remains the same
over the two periods: γ1 = γ2.
Proof. See the Appendix
Proposition 7 implies that in equilibrium the IMF will stop lending less often than
it would be recommended by a socially optimal lending rule. Figure 2 represents the
welfare loss and the private gain in reputation of the IMF as a function of the level
of capital ek. Three relevant cases are represented, according to the value of ek. If
−1 ≤ ek ≤ ←−k , since the welfare loss associated to the choice of lending is greater than
the private gain in reputation, the IMF will not have any incentive to deviate from
the equilibrium strategy not lending (NL). Alternatively, if
−→
k ≤ ek ≤ k, the private
gain in reputation associated to lending (L) is greater than the welfare loss (when
R1 6= R∗), and so the Fund will lend with probability one. Finally, if←−k ≤ ek ≤ −→k , for
the equilibrium strategies to be consistent with the equilibrium beliefs, the probability
of lending (θ(ek)) should be such that the private gain in reputation from choosing
lending is exactly oﬀset by the welfare loss (when R1 6= R∗), namely the IMF should
be indiﬀerent between L and NL.
Proposition 8 Given the IMF reputational lending rule, bRR1 is the value of R1 which
maximises the government’s expected profits over the two periods. We have that bRR1 <bRSO1 .
Proof. Since in equilibrium the IMF will stop lending less often than it would be
recommended by a socially optimal lending rule, this result is proved by applying
Proposition 5
Lemma 9 The reform level chosen by the government in the first period is a decreas-
ing function of the weight that the IMF attaches to the pursuit of its reputation as a
good monitor.
Proof. This result easily follows noting that:
∂
←−
k
∂λ1
< 0
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that is, the greater the weight that the IMF attaches to its reputation gain, the lower
the threshold level of capital that would prevent the country from obtaining a second
loan. Therefore, the departure from the socially optimal lending rule increases with
λ1.
The threat of future termination of an IMF programme is meant to be the main
factor which may contrast the government’s adverse incentives towards reforming.
However, we have shown that if the IMF cares about its reputation as a good monitor,
the existence of uncertainty about its ability to enforce conditionality can distort its
lending policy towards a too lax behaviour. This in turn implies a departure from the
socially optimal level of reform in the first period of the programme. Moreover, the
more lax the lending policy, the higher the probability of financing a negative NPV
project in the second period, since the level of second period reform is an increasing
function of a country’s capital.
6 Empirical model
The main result of the theoretical model implies that the desire to avoid a loss of
reputation might lead the IMF to exhibit some laxity (relative to social optimum)
in interrupting financial programmes. Furthermore, the longer the IMF has been
involved with a country’s reforms, the more its reputation as a good monitor could
be damaged if it decides to stop lending. Thus, taking the IMF share of debt as
a proxy for the length of the relationship between the Fund and a country, in this
section we empirically test the hypothesis that the longer this relationship the more
willing to lend the IMF would be. More specifically, we expect to find a positive
correlation between IMF disbursements and the lagged value of the IMF own debt
share.
We will examine the behaviour of IMF disbursements for the period 1982- 2001.
The reason we focus on this period is that the debt crisis of the early 1980s arguably
marked a shift in regime. Data on loans are from Global Development Finance (GDF)
and World Development Indicator (WDI) statistics of the World Bank. We confine
our attention to long-term loans (except in the IMF case where there is no such
distinction), since the GDF database does not provide any information on the type
of creditor in the case of short-term loans. However, Figure 3 shows that short-term
loans have been a small share of total loans for the period under investigation and
thus long-term loans are fairly representative of the aggregate.
We estimate a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries, over the years 1982-
2001, including both country-specific and time eﬀects. Data availability has also
limited the sample group to 53 middle-income countries, instead of the original 93
countries. We have chosen a dynamic specification, i.e. we included a lag of the
dependent variable among the regressors, to account for the short run dynamics of
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IMF disbursements. The dynamic specification allows for a correct estimation of the
eﬀect of high levels of debt by controlling for the autocorrelation of IMF disburse-
ments. Moreover, we included lagged values of most of the regressors to control for
endogeneity.
The estimated equations for net loans and grants are as follows:
Di,t = b0 + b1Di,t−1 + b2D
j
i,t−1 + b3B
j
i,t−1 + b4Zi,t−1 + b5Ci + b6Tt + b7HiB
j
i,t−1 (16)
where Di,t denotes IMF disbursements (relative to GDP) to country i and D
j
i,t−1 de-
notes long-term disbursements (relative to GDP) to country i from creditor j (i.e. bi-
lateral, multilateral and private creditors, as distinguished between commercial banks
loans and bonds). To examine the relation between IMF disbursements and a coun-
try’s degree of indebtedness, we consider the stock of debt owed to the IMF and the
stock of long-term debt (relative to GDP) owed to bilateral, multilateral and private
creditors (distinguished between commercial banks and private bondholders) and en-
ter the five types of debt separately. That is, Bji,t−1 is the vector of the stocks of debt
held by diﬀerent creditors.22
To control for countries characteristics, we include the set of variables Zi,t−1 as
explanatory variables. They have been chosen among those suggested by the liter-
ature on IMF loans determinants, which, however, does not specifically distinguish
between the determinants of the loan amount and the determinants of the arrange-
ments themselves. As Knight and Santaella (1997) point out, the regressions can be
interpreted as a reduced form derived from both the “demand” for an IMF programme
by a recipient country and the IMF “supply”. In the “demand side,” their estimates
suggest that lower level of international reserves, per capita GDP, domestic invest-
ment and higher values of the external debt service, movements in the real exchange
rate, a dummy indicating previous Fund arrangements are significant determinants
of a country’s interest in a Fund arrangement. Among the supply factors, they find
that policy measures to increase fiscal revenue, to reduce government expenditure, to
tighten domestic credit and to adjust the exchange rate, positively aﬀect the Fund
approval of an arrangement. More recently, following the increasing interest on the
impact of political and institutional factors on economic performance,23 political, in-
stitutional and social type of variables have also been considered. According to Sturm
et al. (2004), however, while mostly economic variables are robustly related to IMF
lending activity, most political variables are non-significant.24
Therefore, the set Zt−1 include (previous year) economic performance as measured
with the per capita income, the rate of inflation, GDP growth, the amount of inter-
national reserves (to imports), the current account balance (to GDP), the domestic
22Figure 4 actually presents the pattern of these debt shares in the period 1981-’01.
23Among others, see Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Knack and Keefer (1995).
24To the extent that political factors matter, they seem more closely related to the conclusion of
an agreement with the IMF than to the disbursement of an IMF loan.
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(fixed) investments (to GDP), the growth of government consumption (to GDP), to-
tal debt service (to exports). These variables should control for the demand side of
IMF loans. More specifically, lower per capita income, higher inflation, lower GDP
growth, lower investments, smaller reserves, higher deficits of the current account,
higher growth in government expenditure and higher debt service should all increase
the probability that a country ultimately turns to the IMF for funding.
At the same time, however, the willingness of the IMF to provide a loan might
be lower in case of high inflation and increasing government expenditure (supply
side). Among the “supply side variables” we also include population among the
regressors, as larger countries may more easily get financial support to the extent
that the “contagion” risk of a balance of payments problem in these countries is
higher than in smaller countries (the “too big to fail” hypothesis).
As far as the quality of institutions is concerned, we include a PRCL dummy, i.e.
a dummy=1 for either free or partly free countries and 0 otherwise (according to the
index of “Political Rights and Civil Liberties” or PCRL). The IMF should generally
prefer lending to countries that are more liberal and with better institutions (Bird
and Rowlands, 2001).25
The countries dummies Ci are used to control for country specific characteristics.
We also expect them to capture some other supply side (strategic) motivations for
IMF loans, which have been examined in the literature:26 for example measures of
political cohesion or ethnic fractionalisation (leading to conflicts in society and thus
undermining the reform eﬀorts), special interests (such as special interests represented
in parliament), share of IMF quotas. Finally, Tt is a set of time dummies.
To further investigate on the possibly positive relation between IMF loans and
the degree of a country’s indebtedness we test whether this relation is significantly
diﬀerent than in the case of more (than the sample average) indebted countries respect
to the rest of the sample. We do so by interacting the debt (relative to GDP) owed
to the IMF, to bilateral and multilateral creditors, to commercial banks and private
bondholders with the dummy HDi (high ratios of both debt to export and debt to
GDP) which takes the value of one in the case of a more (than the average) indebted
country. More specifically, HD is equal to one if a country reaches either a value
of its debt to export ratio greater than the sample average (199%) or a value of its
debt to GDP ratio greater than the sample average (56%). In particular, under the
hypothesis of “lending driven by reputation”, the amount of loans that the IMF is
willing to provide, should increase with the stock of debt held.
25We did not consider the eﬀect that elections might have on the incentive of a government to
turn to the Fund. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), for example, find evidence which suggests that
governments are more likely to enter an agreement early in the election term, hoping that any
perceived stigma of signing it will be forgotten before the next elections. Dreher and Vaubel (2004)
report that the net credit supplied by the Fund is higher on election time, which in turn suggests
that IMF credit might help governments to finance electoral campaigns.
26See Barro and Lee (2003) and Ivanova et al. (2000).
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Tables 2 and 3 contain all the details on our variable definitions and sources.
6.1 The estimation method
We adopt a GLS fixed eﬀect estimator in order to control for countries unobservables
and to correct for heteroskedasticity across countries. To account for the short run
dynamics of net loans and grants we include a lag of the dependent variable among
the regressors. The dynamic specification allows for a correct estimation of the eﬀect
of high levels of debt by controlling for the autocorrelation of the IMF disbursements.
Indeed, a strong dependence of the IMF disbursements from the IMF debt share in
the static specification might actually reflect the autocorrelation of the disbursements
which are typically disbursed in a number of installments over time. Without cor-
recting for the short run dynamics, a correlation between loans and debt could reflect
a common deterministic trend. The time dummies capture the contemporaneous
correlations across countries.
In a typical panel, which has vastly more individuals than time periods, the in-
clusion of the lagged dependent variable would introduce a bias since the dependent
variable, and thus the lagged dependent variable (a right hand regressor), are func-
tions of the individual specific component of the error term. Nickell (1981) shows
that in the AR(1) case the bias in estimating a dynamic fixed eﬀects model becomes
less important as T grows. Judson and Owen (1999) test the performance of the least
squares fixed eﬀects estimator by means of Monte Carlo simulations, concentrating on
panels with typical macroeconomic dimensions (like ours), i.e. small N and T. Their
analysis suggest that the fixed eﬀects estimator performs fairly well when T>20, i.e.
with a T dimension similar to ours.
The fixed eﬀects assumes homoskedasticity and if the assumption is not met then
the estimates will be ineﬃcient. A groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity test
was performed on the residuals of the baseline model estimated by OLS. The test
is chi-squared distributed with N-1 degrees of freedom, where N is the number of
groups in the sample. The result of the test led to a rejection of the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity across groups for both net loans and grants regressions.
Baltagi and Li (1995) suggest an LM test for serial correlation in fixed eﬀects
models where the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics is calculated for large
T. Under the alternative assumption for the error autocorrelation structure, i.e. an
AR(1), the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the disturbance is not rejected
at conventional levels. Thus, we did not correct for the autocorrorrelations in the
residuals and to adopt a feasible fixed eﬀect GLS estimator, incorporating only het-
eroskedasticity across countries.
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7 Estimation results
We estimate our panel of 53 countries for the period 1982 to 2001 by GLS with
country-specific eﬀects and time eﬀects. The hypotheses of not significance of country
dummies and time dummies were indeed rejected at any reasonable significance level,
is shown in Table 4. The results of the estimation of equation (1) is also presented in
Table 4.
As expected, IMF loans are rather persistent. Interestingly, and consistently with
other results in this literature, economic performance does appear to influence IMF
lending . Column 1 shows that the a lower GDP growth, lower international reserves,
higher current account deficits, and smaller investments all have a positive eﬀect on
IMF lending (i.e. a worse economic performance increase the demand for IMF loans)
and these eﬀects are significant at the 5% level (except for the impact of the reserves
level which is significant only at the 10%). By contrast, per capita GDP and the rate
of inflation do not significantly aﬀect IMF loans and the growth rate of government
consumption negatively aﬀects the probability of an agreement with the IMF (though
not at conventional levels of significance). A heavy debt service burden (relative to
exports) increases countries’ need for external finance to service their debt and thus
their demand for loans, where this eﬀect is highly significant (at the 1%).27 Finally,
the dummy for greater “Political Rights and Civil Liberties” has the expected positive
sign even if it is not significant at the conventional level.
The important evidence concerns the eﬀect of the debt shares (that we divide
into IMF, bilateral, multilateral, commercial bank debt and into debt held by private
bondholders) on IMF disbursements, depending on the debt holder type. Column
1 shows that the coeﬃcients on the debt ratios are all positive (except for the debt
share of the multilaterals which is negative) but that only the coeﬃcients of the IMF
quota is highly significant (at the 5%), while the coeﬃcient of the share of debt held
by commercial banks is also significant but only at the 10% level. Thus, the IMF
looks strikingly more generous with high-(IMF) debt countries than with low-(IMF)
debt countries.28 The estimated regressions show that IMF disbursements are not
significantly related to previous-year disbursements from any other group of creditors:
only the lagged dependent variable is strongly significant (at 5%).
This relation between IMF new loans and IMF debt suggests that debt ownership
appears to be an important determinant of the Fund lending decisions. Indeed, IMF
disbursements significantly increase with the lagged value of the IMF outstanding
debt, while the impact of bilateral and multilateral debt and of the debt share held by
private bondholders is not significant, at least at conventional levels. This evidence
27If interpreted as a supply side type of variable, it could also imply that the IMF is more willing
to give loans if a country is used to service its debt.
28We should note that this relationship cannot be explained by the IMF being the greatest creditor
of these countries. On the contrary, Figure 4 shows that the IMF debt share is the lowest.
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clearly confirms that the IMF is positively influenced by its own debt share when
deciding about whether continuing lending. In turn, this is consistent with the main
prediction of the theoretical model, according to which the longer the relationship
between the country and the IMF, the stronger the IMF concern for reputation and
so the more willing to lend the IMF will be.29
To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimated equations (1) using a di-
chotomic variable as a proxy of high indebtedness and the results are presented in
column 2 of Table 4. Previous results are generally confirmed by the new estimates.
IMF disbursements are highly persistent and, among the regressors related to a bor-
rower’s economic performance, those having significant coeﬃcients are the same as
those presented in column 1. Namely, the growth rate of GDP (negative and signif-
icant at 5%), the level of international reserves (negative and significant at 5%), the
deficit of the current account (now only significant at 10%) and the total debt service
(positive and significant at 1%). More importantly, while a higher stock of IMF debt
is not related to IMF disbursements, for “below the average-indebted countries”, in
the case of “above the average-indebted countries”, the coeﬃcient of the IMF debt
share, interacted with the HD dummy, is positive and significant at the 5% level.
Since this result does not apply for all the other debt shares interacted with the
HD dummy, we believe this represents further evidence in support of our theoretical
results.
Finally, Table 5 shows that these results are robust respect to the inclusion of
further lags of the IMF own share of debt. In column 1, only the coeﬃcient of the
(two years) lagged IMF debt share is highly significant (at the 5%), while the impact
of bilateral, multilateral and private debt is not significant, at least at conventional
levels. In column 2, the coeﬃcient of the (two years) lagged IMF debt share, interacted
with the HD dummy, is positive and significant at the 5% level.
8 Conclusions
IMF conditionality specifies policies and structural reforms which borrowing coun-
tries must meet in order to obtain an IMF loan. In principle, the Fund can enable
governments to implement economic reforms as a result of the leverage it exerts as
a creditor. In practice the eﬀectiveness of the conditional lending approach has been
limited and numerous empirical studies have shown that a large proportion of Fund
29This evidence could also be consistent with the hypothesis of the IMF just being concerned with
avoiding default with a country, for example not to report an economic loss in its balance sheets
(defensive lending). However, even the case of defensive lending looks consistent with the existence
of a concern for reputation. A concern for financial stability looks, instead, as a weaker explanation
for IMF disbursements. In fact, if it was really an issue, new disbursements should be correlated also
with other creditors’ debt shares and not only with the IMF one (especially since it is the lowest, as
Figure 4 shows).
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programs have not been successfully completed. In other words, long-term finan-
cial assistance has often come with an increasing debt burden but with only modest
reforms.
This unsatisfactory record of conditional lending has been explained referring
to both demand side and supply side factors. Among the latter (i.e. sources of
ineﬃciency within the IMF), the literature has pointed out how the existence of
bureaucratic and political biases and altruism might be responsible for the lack of
credibility characterising the IMF threat of interrupting financial assistance when a
country is not complying with conditionality.
In this paper we also argue that the lack of credibility of the termination threat
may be one possible explanation of conditional lending failure. However, we suggest
that such lack of credibility might be attributed to a concern for reputation of the
IMF, which acts at the same time as a creditor and a monitor of reforms.
The IMF desire to hide its surveillance failures, in order to preserve its reputation
of being a good monitor, may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater
laxity (relative to social optimum) in punishing non-compliance with economic re-
forms. Moreover, such distortionary incentives (towards excessive lending) may be
exacerbated by the length of the relationship between a country and the IMF. In
fact, the longer this relationship, the more informative (for the quality of the IMF
monitoring) the decision to interrupt a programme will be, since this outcome will
have been influenced by many past monitoring actions.
We have empirically tested the hypothesis that larger departures from socially
optimal lending rule are associated with longer relationships between a country and
the IMF, namely that the longer the IMF has been involved with a country, the larger
its disbursements will be. The Fund own share of debt is taken here as a proxy of
the duration of its relationship with a country. Estimating a dynamic panel of 53
middle-income countries for the period 1982-2001, we have empirically investigated
whether a high debt ,and its composition by type of creditors, played an important
role in explaining the allocation of IMF disbursements, while controlling for countries’
characteristics and their economic performance. Our empirical results show that
a higher level of IMF debt significantly increases IMF disbursements. Thus, the
empirical evidence is consistent with the main prediction of the theory.
An immediate policy implication of our analysis would be that, in order to elimi-
nate distortions in the IMF lending policy, it would be better to separate its responsi-
bility of lending from that of monitoring. For example, the IMF could be responsible
for designing appropriate policy conditions, monitoring and reporting, while, based
on such reports, financial support could be decided by a separated intergovernmental
body. An alternative proposal would envisage giving back to governments the respon-
sibility for designing and implementing economic reforms. The surveillance function
should be limited to the periodical evaluation of the attainment of objectives, rather
than to the implementation of particular policy measures (Collier et al., 1997). In
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other words, substituting “procedures conditionality” with “target conditionality”,
the IMF would be less involved in managing reforms at a micro level and, in turn, it
would be less responsible for observed disappointing results in the recipient countries.
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9 Appendix: Omitted proofs
Proof. of Proposition 7
Let’s start from the second stage. Let’s suppose that −1 ≤ ek ≤ ←−k and that at
t=1 lending (L) has been observed. Applying Bayes’ rule, we obtain:
γ2(L,−1 ≤ ek ≤ ←−k ) = γρgγρg + (1− γ)ρb
Then, the IMF private gain from reputation would be equal to: γ1(L) + δγ2(L,−1 ≤ek ≤ ←−k ), where:
γ1(L) = prob(g | L) =
γprob(L | g)
γprob(L | g) + (1− γ)prob(L | b)
and
prob(L | g) = ρg + (1− ρg)
Z I+y−1
←−k
θ(ek)h(ek | R1 = bRR1 )d
and
prob(L | b) = ρb + (1− ρb)
Z I+y−1
←−k
θ(ek)h(ek | R1 = bRR1 )dek.
Alternatively, if −1 ≤ ek ≤ ←−k and at t=1 not lending (NL) has been observed, the
IMF private gain from reputation would be equal to: γ1(NL) + δγ1(NL), where:
γ1(NL) = prob(g | NL) =
γ(1− ρg)
γ(1− ρg) + (1− γ)(1− ρb)
.
Therefore, if the IMF chooses to continue lending, irrespective of ek being too small,
its private gain in reputation with respect to the alternative strategy would be
Gmax = γ1(L) + δγ2(L,−1 ≤ ek ≤ ←−k )− (γ1(NL) + δγ1(NL)) (A-1)
which can be easily shown to be positive.
Now let:
WL(ek) = 1− p2( bR2(ek))I2
be the welfare loss of the second period project. Notice that WL is continuously
decreasing with ek (see Proposition 1) and that WL(.)=0 when ek = k.We also assume
that the maximum value of λ2WL(ek) (λ2WL(ek = −1) is greater than λ1G.
In order to have equilibrium strategies consistent with the equilibrium beliefs, the
following inequality must hold:
λ2WL(ek) > λ1Gmax, for− 1 ≤ ek ≤ ←−k .
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Then, let
←−
k be such that
λ2WL(
←−
k ) = λ1Gmax
Therefore, when −1 ≤ ek ≤ ←−k , the IMF has no incentive to deviate from the equilib-
rium strategy (NL).
Let’s now suppose that
←−
k < ek ≤ k and that at t=1 lending (L) has been observed.
Noting that, when ek < k, the first period project has surely failed (ek = ekf), applying
Bayes’ rule, we obtain:
γ2(L,
←−
k < ek ≤ k) = (A-2)
γ(ρg(1− p1(R∗)) + (1− ρg)θ(ek)(1− p1( bRR1 ))
γ(ρg(1− p1(R∗)) + (1− ρg)θ(ek)(1− p1( bRR1 )) + (1− γ)(ρb(1− p1(R∗)) + (1− ρb)θ(ek)(1− p1( bRR1 ))
from which it is easy to show that (17) reaches its maximum value when θ(
←−
k ) = 0
and its minimum when θ(
−→
k ) = 1 and:
∂γ2(L,
←−
k < ek ≤ k)
∂ek < 0
Moreover,
limek→←−k γ2(L,ek) = γρgγρg + (1− γ)ρb
and
γ2(L,
←−
k < ek ≤ k) = (A-3)
γ(ρg(1− p1(R∗)) + (1− ρg)(1− p1( bRR1 ))
γ(ρg(1− p1(R∗)) + (1− ρg)(1− p1( bRR1 )) + (1− γ)(ρb(1− p1(R∗)) + (1− ρb)(1− p1( bRR1 )) .
Therefore, if the IMF chooses to continue lending, when
←−
k < ek ≤ k, its private gain
in reputation with respect to the alternative strategy would be:
G(θ(ek)) = γ1(L) + δγ2(L,←−k < ek ≤ k)− (γ1(NL) + δγ1(NL)) (A-4)
where
∂G(θ(ek))
∂ek < 0, limek→←−kG(θ(ek)) = Gmax and G(θ(ek)) |−→k ≤ek≤k= Gmin,
Since the probability to continue lending is increasing with ek, the signal becomes
less informative as capital grows. Notice that Gmin is found substituting (17) into
(A-4) and Gmax was defined in A-1.
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For the equilibrium strategies to be consistent with the equilibrium beliefs, the
probability to continue lending is found implicitly, solving for θ(ek) :
λ1G(θ(ek)) = λ2WL(ek) (A-5)
so that, when
←−
k ≤ ek ≤ −→k , the payoﬀ associated to the strategy NL is the same as
the payoﬀ associated to the strategy L. Notice that
−→
k is found by solving (A-5) for ek
when the probability of continuing lending is 1. Since WL(ek = k) = 0 and Gmin> 0,
it is immediate to verify that
−→
k < k.
Finally, as G(ek) = Gmin > 0, when −→k ≤ ek ≤ k, it follows that λ1Gmin ≥
λ2WL(ek). Thus, in this interval, the IMF will lend with probability one even if R1 6=
R∗.
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Table 1: List of middle income countries in the sample 
1) Algeria 28) Malaysia 
2) Argentina 29) Mauritius 
3) Belize 30) Mexico 
4) Bolivia 31) Morocco 
5) Botswana 32) Oman 
6) Brazil 33) Panama 
7) Cape Verde 34) Paraguay 
8) Chile 35) Peru 
9) China 36) Philippines 
10) Colombia 37) Poland 
11) Costa Rica 38) Romania 
12) Dominica 39) Seychelles 
13) Dominican Republic 40) Sri Lanka 
14) Ecuador 41) St. Kitts and Nevis 
15) Egypt, Arab Rep. 42) St. Lucia 
16) El Salvador 43) St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
17) Fiji 44) Swaziland 
18) Gabon 45) Syrian Arab Republic 
19) Grenada 46) Thailand 
20) Guatemala 47) Tonga 
21) Guyana 48) Trinidad and Tobago 
22) Honduras 49) Tunisia 
23) Hungary 50) Turkey 
24) Indonesia 51) Uruguay 
25) Iran, Islamic Rep. 52) Vanuatu 
26) Jamaica 53) Venezuela, RB 
27) Jordan  
Source: World Bank, GDF CD-ROM, 2004  
Table 2: Variables definition 
Variable Definition Units 
Population Population Billions units 
Pc-GDP  Gross Domestic Product Ratio to Population (thousands units) 
Inflation Consumer Price Index Annual Rate of change 
Gr-GDP Real GDP growth Annual Rate of change 
Reserves International reserves Ratio to Imports 
Current Account Current Account Ratio to GDP 
Investments Goss fixed domestic investments Ratio to GDP 
Gr-Government Consumption Gov Consumption growth Annual Rate of change 
dPRCL Political Right&Civil Liberties Dummy variable=1 for either partially or 
totally free countries; 0 otherwise 
Total debt service Total debt service Ratio to Exports 
IMF Disbursments IMF Disbursments Ratio to GDP 
Multilateral Disbursments Bilateral Grants Ratio to GDP 
Bilateral Disbursment Multilateral Disbursments Ratio to GDP 
Bank Disbursments Bank Disbursments Ratio to GDP 
Bonds Disbursments Bonds Disbursments Ratio to GDP 
IMF Debt IMF Debt Ratio to GDP 
IMF Debt IMF Debt Ratio to GDP 
Multilateral Debt Long term Mul Debt Ratio to GDP 
Bilateral Debt Long term Bilateral Debt Ratio to GDP 
Bank Debt Long term Bank Debt Ratio to GDP 
Bonds Debt Long term Bonds Debt Ratio to GDP 
Table 3: Data source 
Variable Source 
Population International Financial Statistics 
Pc-GDP  World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Inflation World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Gr-GDP World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
International reserves Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Current Account Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Investments World Development Indicators 
Gr-Government Consumption World Development Indicators 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties Freedom House 
Total debt service Global Development Finance (GDF) 
IMF Disbursments Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Multilateral Disbursments Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bilateral Disbursment Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bank Disbursments Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bonds Disbursments Global Development Finance (GDF) 
IMF Debt Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Multilateral Debt Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bilateral Debt Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bank Debt Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bonds Debt Global Development Finance (GDF) 
 
Table 4 IMF Debt Disbursments 
 IMF Dis  IMF Dis with interactions 
Population 0.0116 0.0122 
 (1.300) (1.377) 
Pc-GDP (-1) 0.00005 0.00002 
 (0.222) (0.102) 
Inflation (-1) 0.00004 0.00005 
 (0.896) (1.039) 
Gr-GDP (-1) -0.0081** -0.0088** 
 (2.199) (2.361) 
Reserves (-1) -0.0014* -0.0016** 
 (1.823) (2.007) 
Current Account (-1) -0.0055** -0.0043* 
 (2.172) (1.681) 
Investment (-1) -0.0069** -0.0069** 
 (2.291) (2.281) 
Gr-Gov Consumption (-1) -0.0009 -0.0008 
 (1.090) (0.898) 
dPRCL 0.0010 0.0009 
 (1.487) (1.451) 
Total Debt Service (-1) 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 
 (2.826) (2.789) 
Debt Share M (-1) -0.0061 -0.0045 
 (1.545) (0.929) 
Debt Share IMF (-1) 0.0364** 0.0065 
 (2.568) (0.351) 
Debt Share B (-1) 0.0026 0.0024 
 (1.103) (0.607) 
Debt Share Banks (-1) 0.0049* -0.0001 
 (1.832) (0.028) 
Debt Share Bonds (-1) 0.0015 -0.0065 
 (0.292) (0.740) 
Disbursments M (-1) 0.0074 0.0109 
 (0.488) (0.719) 
Disbursments IMF (-1) 0.0596** 0.0761** 
 (1.985) (2.462) 
Disbursments B (-1) 0.0061 0.0084 
 (0.531) (0.727) 
Disbursments Banks (-1) -0.0008 0.0024 
 (0.087) (0.255) 
Disbursments Bonds (-1) -0.0216 -0.0208 
 (1.070) (0.994) 
Debt Share M (-1) dHD  -0.0015 
  (0.397) 
Debt Share IMF (-1) dHD  0.0490** 
  (2.464) 
Debt Share B (-1) dHD  -0.0005 
  (0.117) 
Debt Share Banks (-1) dHD  0.0031 
  (0.792) 
Debt Share Bonds (-1) dHD  0.0085 
  (1.028) 
Constant 0.0044** 0.0046** 
 (2.311) (2.459) 
Observations 1060 1060 
Number of countries 53 53 
Number of years 20 20 
SE of regression 0.011 0.011 
SE of Dependent variable 0.013 0.013 
TD joint significance test Prob>chi2=0.018 Prob>chi2=0.034 
CD joint significance test Prob>chi2=0.067 Prob>chi2=0.193 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 5 IMF Debt Disbursments (-2) 
 IMF Dis  IMF Dis with interactions 
Population 0.0120 0.0129 
 (1.180) (1.286) 
Pc-GDP (-1) 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.150) (0.118) 
Inflation (-1) 0.0000 0.0001 
 (1.004) (1.111) 
Gr-GDP (-1) -0.0080** -0.0088** 
 (2.145) (2.322) 
Reserves (-1) -0.0018** -0.0018** 
 (2.099) (2.139) 
Current Account (-1) -0.0061** -0.0039 
 (2.239) (1.409) 
Investment (-1) -0.0067** -0.0069** 
 (2.108) (2.144) 
Gr-Gov Consumption (-1) -0.0012 -0.0010 
 (1.395) (1.120) 
dPRCL 0.0006 0.0007 
 (0.779) (0.996) 
Total Debt Service (-1) 0.0038*** 0.0039*** 
 (2.995) (3.080) 
Debt Share M (-1) -0.0044 -0.0009 
 (1.128) (0.176) 
Debt Share IMF (-2) 0.0290** -0.0087 
 (2.526) (0.526) 
Debt Share B (-1) 0.0028 0.0016 
 (1.129) (0.383) 
Debt Share Banks (-1) 0.0042 -0.0038 
 (1.523) (0.864) 
Debt Share Bonds (-1) 0.0019 -0.0046 
 (0.361) (0.483) 
Disbursments M (-1) 0.0008 0.0079 
 (0.054) (0.498) 
Disbursments IMF (-1) 0.1564*** 0.1464*** 
 (4.239) (3.970) 
Disbursments B (-1) -0.0070 -0.0044 
 (0.580) (0.366) 
Disbursments Banks (-1) 0.0079 0.0134 
 (0.795) (1.354) 
Disbursments Bonds (-1) -0.0255 -0.0234 
 (1.211) (1.085) 
Debt Share M (-1) dHD  -0.0037 
  (0.926) 
Debt Share IMF (-2) dHD  0.0582*** 
  (3.082) 
Debt Share B (-1) dHD  0.0007 
  (0.169) 
Debt Share Banks (-1) dHD  0.0060 
  (1.500) 
Debt Share Bonds (-1) dHD  0.0063 
  (0.718) 
Constant 0.0023 0.0038 
 (0.638) (1.034) 
Observations 1007 1007 
Number of countries 53 53 
Number of years 19 19 
SE of regression 0.011 0.011 
SE of Dependent variable 0.013 0.013 
TD joint significance test Prob>chi2=0.008 Prob>chi2=0.027 
CD joint significance test Prob>chi2=0.381 Prob>chi2=0.363 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 3: Long and short term debt shares
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Figure 4: Disaggregated debt shares - middle income countries
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